Two ongoing controversies within recent Philippine War scholarship concern the questions of total Filipino mortality and the degree to which U.S. soldiers practiced various forms of illegal violence against both combatants and noncombatants. Some estimates of combined military and civilian casualties between 1899 and 1903 have run as high as 500,000, to include the cholera epidemic of 1902-3, often viewed as a direct consequence of the U.S. occupation.3 In its most advanced formulation, however, this argument relies on two anachronisms. First, it assumes an archipelagowide employment during 1899-1901 of the same tactics used during the 1902 campaigns in Batangas and Samar .4
And secondly, it displaces onto an earlier guerrilla struggle the nation's recently acquired knowledge of illegal killings during the Vietnam War. After My Lai, it became easy to assume that a similar mixture of racism, tactical frustration, and poor leadership at the platoon level led to equally widespread atrocities in the Philippines.' However, one element is missing from this Vietnam-era connection between individual hostility and collective violence: the restraint imposed on soldier behavior by a functioning military justice system. From this perspective, the critical question is not whether U.S. infantrymen in 1900 were racist and ethnocentric, and thus potentially abusive, but whether they were allowed to violate the protections guaranteed Filipino civilians and prisoners of war under contemporary U.S. martial law.
This essay examines the administration of military justice in four United States Volunteer Infantry regiments stationed in the southern Philippines during 1900 and early 1901, in order to determine how well their men honored the Army's instructions for the treatment of noncombatants and surrendered guen illas 6 Under orders in the field,
